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This appeal is from a conviction £nd judgment for 
bigamy, a third degree felony, following a guilty plea in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit County, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7p-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) 
and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant waived the tight to appeal the 
trial court's pre-trial denial of defendant's motions to dismiss 
and to suppress. 
2. Whether defendant was selected for prosecution by 
the State based upon standards that denied him equal protection 
of the law. 
3. Because the trial court did not rule on the 
substance of defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence 
seized, whether the issue can be considered on appeal. 
4. In the alternative, was the inventory proper and 
was defendant's subsequent confession tainted by prior unlawful 
conduct by the police. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David Bruce Geer, was charged by information 
with bigamy, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-101 (1978), and falsification of government record, a 
class B misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-511 
(1978). Defendant filed motions in limine to dismiss the 
information and to suppress physical evidence seized from him, 
statements made by a third person, and his confession. The trial 
court denied the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to 
suppress with respect to defendant's confession; the court made 
no ruling with respect to the remainder of the motion to 
suppress. Defendant then entered a plea of guilty to the charge 
of bigamy in exchange for dismissal of the charge of 
falsification of government record, reserving the right to appeal 
the trial court's ruling on the motions in limine. 
STATEMENT PF THE FACTS 
David Bruce Geer has, by his own admission, been 
married to 13 different women while having no knowledge that he 
has ever been divorced (T. 25-26).* Defendant confessed to the 
charge of bigamy in the present case; he informed the 
investigating officer that he was married at the time he married 
the complainant, Colleen Edwards (R. 3; T. 25-26) . 
1
 The transcript of the hearing on December 21, 1987, has been 
numbered into the record on appeal as R. 54; the individual pages 
of the transcript have not been numbered into the record. 
Therefore, all references denoted by •(T. )" refer to the page 
number as found in the hearing transcript. 
-2-
Sergeant Mann, a member of the Utah Highway Patrol who 
is currently assigned to the Utah State Organized Crime Bureau, 
met with Ms. Edwards on November 3, 1987, after she had contacted 
his office to report the activities of defendant, her husband (T. 
11-12). Prior to the meeting, Sgt. Mann discovered through the 
National Crime Information Computer that defendant was wanted on 
an outstanding felony warrant for fraud in the State of Missouri, 
and Sgt. Mann obtained a copy of the warrant (T. 13)• At the 
meeting, Ms. Edwards informed Sgt. Mann of defendant's suspicious 
activities. She reported that defendant had a number of credit 
cards in his possession that did not appear to be his and bore 
the names of other women, that he had been piaking calls to 
various dating services, and that he traveled extensively while 
he had no obvious means of support (T. 12). Ms. Edwards informed 
Sgt. Mann that defendant was scheduled to arrive at the Salt Lake 
International Airport on the night of November 14, 1987 (T. 13). 
On November 5, 1987, Sgt. Mann contacted Detective Mike 
Payne of the Fulton County, Missouri, Sheriff's Office, the 
office that had issued the felony arrest warrant on defendant. 
Sgt. Mann was informed that defendant was wanted on the fraud 
charge as the result of having passed bad checks drawn on a 
checking account in the name of David B. Geer or Deborah 
Syversen-Geer held at the Lakeside National Bank (T. 16). 
On the night of November 14, 1987, Sgt. Mann was 
present when defendant arrived at the airport and arrested him on 
the felony warrant (T. 13, 20). At the time of the arrest, 
defendant was carrying three pieces of luggage, which included a 
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black leather briefcase, a camera bag containing "expensive 
camera equipment," and a suitcase containing clothes (T. 20). At 
the time defendant was arrested, he was informed of his rights 
under Miranda and was subsequently taken to the organized crimes 
office for questioning prior to being booked into the Salt Lake 
County jail (T. 22). 
Jail policy prohibits storage of large personal items 
belonging to an arrested person at the jail and requires the 
arresting agency to store them (T. 22). Once defendant was 
arrested, Sgt:. Mann became responsible for the safekeeping of the 
luggage (T. 18, 22). In accordance with policy established by 
the Utah Highway Patrol concerning items that are in a 
defendant's possession at the time of arrest that are not 
otherwise disposed of, Sgt. Mann performed an inventory on the 
luggage prior to storing it in a locked area at his office (T. 
17-18, 23). Sgt. Mann was not conducting a search during the 
inventory (T. 14). He had previously advised defendant that he 
would have to inventory the luggage and defendant apparently 
responded only that he wanted to be present during the inventory. 
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel 
questioned Sgt. Mann about three items found in defendant's 
possession, including a checkbook, credit cards, and a 
telephone/address directory; it appears that these are the items 
of "physical evidence" defendant sought to suppress. During the 
inventory, Sgt. Mann observed a checkbook imprinted with the 
names of David Bruce Geer and Deborah Syverson Geer, and, based 
upon the information he had been given by the detective in 
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Missouri concerning the fraud charge resulting from a bad check 
drawn on the account in this name held at the Lakeside National 
Bank, Sgt. Mann believed the checkbook to be evidence of a crime 
(T. 16, 17), During discussion about the credit cards, defendant 
located and showed Sgt. Mann the address/telephone directory so 
that Sgt. Mann could contact the apparent owner, Janice Ruben (T. 
18-19). The address book contained the names of other women as 
well, who were categorized alphabetically by state (e.g., under 
"A" were those residing in Alabama, etc.) (T+ 25). 
After defendant was booked into thfc Salt Lake County 
jail on the night of his arrest, Sgt. Mann had no more contact 
with him until November 16, 1987. When Sgt. Mann arrived at work 
on the 16th, he found two messages from defendant awaiting him 
(T. 23). In response to the messages, Sgt. Mann went to the jail 
(T. 23). At defendant's request, he was taken later that day to 
Sgt. Mann's office to discuss the allegations (T. 23, 24). 
Defendant was again informed of his Miranda rights, waived them, 
and told the officers, over the next four hours, the details of 
his activities (T. 24). 
Defendant filed two motions in limine, including a 
motion to dismiss the charges based on allegations of selective 
prosecution which denied defendant equal protection and a motion 
to suppress "all physical evidence discovered after defendant was 
stopped at Salt Lake International Airport," "[a]ny and all 
statements of Janice Ruben," and "[a]ny and all statements of 
Defendant" (R. 9, 17). On December 21, 1987, the trial court 
heard defendant's motions in limine (R. 54). Defense counsel 
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elicited testimony from Sgt. Mann concerning a checkbook found in 
defendant's briefcase, credit cards in defendant's wallet, and a 
telephone/address directory, the latter of which defendant had 
obtained and shown to the officers (T. 15, 17-19). Following 
oral argument by counsel for defendant and the State, the court 
denied the motion to dismiss (T. 40). With respect to the motion 
to suppress, the court found no impropriety concerning the 
initial stop and the inventory and storage of the luggage, and 
the court denied the motion with respect to defendant's 
confession. In response to a representation by the State that 
the issue concerning the seizure of the credit cards and 
checkbook was moot in view of the fact that there was no 
intention to offer them at trial (T. 32, 39), the court, while 
noting that defense counsel was "reading more into this than the 
Court sees as far as the fruit of the poison tree" made no ruling 
with respect to their admissibility (T. 40). The court also made 
no ruling with respect to the admissibility of statements made by 
Janice Ruben and the telephone/address directory in defendant's 
possession, which were made part of the written motion but were 
not addressed at the close of the hearing on the motion to 
suppress. 
Immediately after the trial court's ruling on the 
motions, defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of bigamy; 
in accordance with a plea negotiation, the misdemeanor was 
dismissed (T. 41). Defendant entered the plea despite his intent 
to appeal the court's ruling on the motions to dismiss and 
suppress (T. 41). This was apparently done without objection 
from the prosecution or the court (T. 41-44). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
By entering a plea of guilty, defendant admitted to the 
correctness of the allegation against him and waived all 
potential claims of error in the trial court. He, therefore, 
cannot appeal the pre-trial rulings by the trial court denying 
his motion to dismiss and motion to suppress. 
Regardless, a prosecutor has broad discretion with 
respect to who is selected for prosecution and defendant was not 
selected for prosecution based upon impermissible standards in 
violation of his constitutional rights, as . There was no abuse 
of discretion in this case and no violation of equal protection 
standards. Defendant must show, and has not, that the 
prosecution of him had a discriminatory effect and that it was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
The trial court made no ruling on the admissibility of 
physical evidence, specifically the checkbook and credit cards, 
located in defendant's possession that was seized by police 
during an inventory because the State had no intention of 
offering into evidence either the checkbook or the credit cards. 
Additionally, with the exception of defendant's confession, the 
court made no ruling on the admissibility of the remaining 
evidence, that defendant had moved to suppress but apparently 
abandoned during the hearing. Therefore, even if the issue was 
not waived by the entry of the guilty plea, there is no issue 
with respect to the suppression of physical evidence for this 
Court to review* 
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The only potential bearing the seizure of items might 
have is with respect to defendant's allegation that his 
confession was "fruit of the poisonous tree." In the event this 
Court finds some relevance to this argument, the inventory of 
defendant's luggage was proper and not a pretext for a search 
without a warrant. The seizure of the incriminatory items, 
although moot, was proper and did not violate his fourth 
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizure. Defendant's confession, which was remote in time to the 
arrest and inventory and was attenuated from the seizure of any 




UNDER UTAH LAW, A DEFENDANT CANNOT ENTER A 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY AND PRESERVE THE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL A TRIAL COURT'S PRE-TRIAL 
RULING. 
When defendant entered his guilty plea, according to 
Utah case law, he waived any question as to the propriety of the 
trial court's pre-trial rulings and, therefore, he is without 
standing to challenge the trial court's ruling on his motion to 
dismiss and motion to suppress. 
In Utah, "[a] plea of guilty is a confession of the 
correctness of the accusation which dispenses with the necessity 
of proof thereof.• State V. Stewart, H O Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383, 
385 (1946). Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily 
entered, no issues exist for trial, fftate v. Yeckf 566 P.2d 1248 
(Utah 1977). Once a defendant enters a plea of guilty he waives 
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any claim of error. State v. Beck. 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978). In 
Beck, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder. On appeal, 
defendant claimed the statement of the peace officer in the 
warrant of arrest was insufficient to justify a finding of 
probable cause. The Court found that defendant's plea of guilty 
resulted in a waiver of any claim of error on the part of the 
officer. £££ Al£G State v. Turner. 30 Utah 2d 286, 517 P.2d 536 
(1973). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether to allow a defendant to enter a guilty plea and 
simultaneously preserve the right to appeal the rulings on 
pretrial suppression motions addressing constitutional issues 
arising from a search. In Tompkins v. State. 705 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 
1985), cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1052 (1986), the Court held that a 
defendant could not make a conditional plea and preserve the 
right to appeal suppression issues, and remanded the case for a 
taking of the proper plea. The Court stated that "[t]he general 
rule in criminal cases is that a defendant who pleads guilty is 
deemed to have admitted all of the elements of the crime charged, 
and that he thus waives all nonjurisdictional defenses." Id* at 
839. S&& alfifi, VallQ V, State. 726 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1986). The 
Court found that the Wyoming rule governing pleas in criminal 
cases, which differs only slightly in substance from Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11 (1958), does not provide for a conditional plea of 
guilty. Rule 11, Utah R. Crim. P., likewise does not provide for 
the entry of a conditional plea, but only for a plea of "not 
guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity or 
guilty and mentally ill." 
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Although the State would ordinarily argue that because 
defendant pled guilty he has waived any claim of error for 
purposes of appeal, the instant case presents an unusual 
situation in that the State apparently agreed mistakenly with 
defendant that he could appeal the denial of his motions to 
dismiss and to suppress, making his plea of guilty conditional. 
A disposal of the instant case on the basis of waiver would 
likely result in a petition for post-conviction relief wherein 
defendant would argue that his counsel was ineffective and, 
further, that prosecutorial error occurred resulting in a plea 
that was involuntary and unintelligent. Thus, the State contends 
that the most expeditious and equitable manner to proceed in this 
case is to remand this case to the trial court and permit 
defendant to withdraw his plea. 
Defendant will most likely argue to this Court that a 
conditional plea of the present type aids judicial economy, in 
that the parties and the court need not proceed with a trial on 
the facts. A remand by this Court would still permit the parties 
to proceed in an expeditious manner. Should the defendant decide 
to plead guilty, no trial would take place. On the other hand, 
should defendant maintain his plea of not guilty, thereby 
preserving the suppression issue for purposes of appeal, the 
parties could stipulate to the facts and conduct a short bench 
trial. 
Defendant may also argue to this Court that a 
conditional plea of the present type is permitted under State v. 
Kay. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). The State strongly encourages 
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this Court to limit the decision in Kay to the facts. In Kay, 
the Utah Supreme Court found that a judge could accept a guilty 
plea in a homicide case conditioned upon an agreement not to 
impose the death penalty. According to the Court, nothing in 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11, Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(f) (Supp. 1987), 
prohibits a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement 
that asks the court to commit itself in advance to impose a 
sentence lawfully within its power. !£. at 1300. Thus, the 
acceptance of that conditional plea was proper, ifi. at 1301. It 
is important to note that Kay was decided under subsection (f) of 
Rule 11; subsection (f) is irrelevant here. 
It is true that Rule 11 does not specifically prohibit 
conditional pleas of the type at issue in the present case, 
wherein defendant wishes to plead guilty and appeal a pre-trial 
ruling. However, in the instant case, the circumstances of which 
differ from those in Kay* Utah case law clearly does not permit 
defendant to plead guilty and then raise errors on appeal other 
than voluntariness of the plea.2 State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 
(Utah 1977); State v. Beck. 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978). Further, 
the acceptance of a conditional plea of the present type 
militates against achieving finality in the criminal process. 
Where in fcax. the condition pertained only to what punishment 
would be imposed at sentencing, here defendant wishes to preserve 
z
 It is apparent from Eax that no Utah law existed which 
prohibited a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement 
that asked the court to commit itself in advance to impose a 
sentence within its power. 
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for appeal the very factual basis upon which his guilty plea 
rests. In Kay* the defendant admitted fully the factual basis 
for his plea but only agreed to do so if he would receive a 
particular sentence. Here, defendant wishes to avoid a trial 
while still disputing the very foundation of his plea. Because 
of the present Utah case law on guilty pleas, this Court should 
not read Kay as permitting conditional pleas of the present type 
and instead should limit Kay to its facts. In any event, should 
this Court question the applicability of the Kay decision to the 
present case, that question is one for the Supreme Court to 
decide, since a ruling that Kay is applicable would result in the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Beck and Yeck being overruled. 
Although an intermediate court of appeals is certainly 
free to criticize the rulings of the superior appellate court, 
£££# e.g,, Selby v. Department of Motor Vehicles. 110 Cal.3d 470, 
168 Cal. Rptr. 36, 37-38 (Cal. App. 1980), in performing the 
primary "error-correcting" function in a two-tiered appellate 
system, it is not in a position to overrule superior authority, 
and it generally should refrain from performing its "law-
declaring" function in cases of great moment. See State v. 
Grawien- 123 Wis.2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Wis. App. 
1985); Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986) (authorizing 
certification of issues to Supreme Court). 
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POINT U 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SELECTED FOR PROSECUTION 
BASED UPON STANDARDS THAT DENIED HIM EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
The trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion 
to dismiss was not erroneous as the defendant was not selectively 
prosecuted. The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that the conscious exercise of some selectivity in the 
decision of whom to prosecute does not violate constitutional 
protections. So long as this decision is not based on 
unjustifiable standards of race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification, there is no violation of equal protection. Oyler 
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
This principle was also recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Starlight Club. 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 
(Utah 1965). In Starlight, the defendant claimed that his rights 
had been violated because there had been only one other 
prosecution under the relevant statute in the preceding two 
years. The Court found the argument that "because no one else 
was prosecuted, defendant was persecuted to be without merit.... 
We think such a conclusion is a non sequitur that could lead to 
rather startling results, requiring for example that a convicted 
burglar could demand release since many other burglars had not 
been prosecuted and convicted, or had not been treated exactly 
the same." Id. at 914. &££. Al&Q. State v. Judd. 27 Utah 2d 79, 
493 P.2d 604 (Utah 1972) (putative father was not denied equal 
protection because others were similarly situated but not 
prosecuted)• 
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The defendant cites Wayte v. United States. 470 U.S. 
598 (1985) as authority for his position that the action must be 
dismissed. Defendant's reliance on Wayte is misplaced. In Wayte 
the defendant was required to register with the Selective Service 
System, but failed to register and wrote several letters to 
government officials reporting that fact and his intent not to 
register in the future. Despite warning letters and efforts to 
persuade him to register, the defendant continued to refuse to 
register and was indicted for knowingly and willfully failing to 
register. The district court dismissed the indictment on the 
ground that the government had failed to rebut the defendants 
prima facie case of selective prosecution. The United States 
Court of Appeals reversed, and the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the government's passive enforcement 
policy, under which it prosecuted only those non-registrants who 
reported themselves or were reported by others, did not violate 
the first amendment or the equal protection clause of the fifth 
amendment. The Supreme Court in so holding had occasion to 
review extensively the question of selective prosecution. The 
Court stated: 
In our criminal justice system, the 
Government retains "broad discretion" as to 
whom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin. 
457 U.S. 368, 380, n.ll, (1982); A£££ui, 
Marshall v. Jerrico. Inc.. 446 U.S. 238, 248 
(1980). "tSlo long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused 
committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and 
what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his 
•14-
discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 364 (1978). This broad discretion 
rests largely on the recognition that the 
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-
suited to judicial review. Such factors as 
the strength of the case, the prosecutionfs 
general deterrence value, the Government's 
enforcement priorities, and the case's 
relationship to the Government's overall 
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible 
to the kind of analysis the courts are 
competent to undertake. . . . 
It is appropriate to judge selective 
prosecution claims according to ordinary 
equal protection standards. See Oyler v. 
Boles, supra. Under our prior cases, these 
standards require petitioner to show both 
that the passive enforcement system had a 
discriminatory effect and that it was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, 442 u.s. 256 (1979); Arlington 
Heights Vt Metropolitan Housing Pevelopment 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. 
CaSLiSr 426 U.S. 229 (1976). . . . 
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-609 (footnotes omitted). 
In the instant case, according to these standards, 
there has not been selective prosecution of defendant. In order 
to prevail, defendant must show that the prosecution had a 
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose. Merely pointing out that others exist 
who were not prosecuted does not meet the requisite showing. 
Further, defendant's allegations that his prosecution was based 
on religion, or more specifically lack of religious belief, is 
ill-founded. The prosecutor had no knowledge of defendant's 
religious preference, if any, and it is the policy of his office 
to prosecute all those engaged in bigamy when there is a 
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reasonable likelihood of success at trial (T. 24-26). In this 
case, the evidence was compelling and included a complaining 
witness-spouse, which is unlike the situation in most polygamous 
relationships cited by defendant (T. 25-26; R. 24-26). 
Defendant argues that "[tJhere is the case of Royston 
Potter who was a police officer in Murray City and who was fired 
because of a polygamous relationship but not criminally 
prosecuted. Mr. Potter then filed a lawsuit against Murray City 
and Isic] in the Federal District Court in and for the District 
of Utah and said lawsuit was dismissed and then Mr. Potter ran 
for Salt Lake County Sherifff but was defeated" (Br. App. 4.) It 
is ironic that the defendant should bring up this case; the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in its 
review of the federal district court's decision in that case 
stated: 
"[M]ere failure to prosecute other 
offenders is no basis for a finding of denial 
of equal protection" Selectivity in the 
enforcement of laws is subject to 
constitutional constraints. Nevertheless, 
the conscious exercise of some selectivity in 
enforcement is not in itself a federal 
constitutional violation so long as the 
selection was not deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification. 
ABL2H# 669 F.2d at 1355. 
Potter v. Murray City. 760 F.2d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir. 1985), 
£££!• denied 474 U.S. 849 (1985), (citations omitted). 
The trial court found no violation of the standards for 
prosecutorial selection set forth in Wayte and stated that there 
had been "some speculations, but nothing concrete to show that 
there has been any selective process..." (T. 10). The 
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enforcement of the bigamy law in this case did not turn on a 
question of defendant's religious beliefs, or the lack thereof. 
Defendant's race and national origin were not factors in this 
prosecution. Rather than marrying as a tenant of personal 
belief, the defendant married women for fraudulent purposes, and 
then did not divorce the previous wife before marrying the next. 
Defendant admitted to Sgt. Mann to having been married thirteen 
times (T. 25), and that he has no knowledge of any divorce 
proceeding (T. 26). Therefore, the prosecution in this case does 
not fall within the prohibited selection process that would 
result in the denial to defendant the equal protection of the 
laws, and defendant's claim is without merit* 
POINT Ul 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE 
SUBSTANCE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SEIZED, THE ISSUE IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Defendant claims that the inventory of his luggage 
while at the organized crimes bureau office, which was done in 
preparation for booking into the jail where ihe luggage could not 
be stored, was a pretext for a full-blown search without a 
warrant. 
First, defendant waived the right to contest any ruling 
that might have been made with respect to the inventory by 
entering a plea of guilty to the charge of bigamy. 
Regardless, there is no issue properly before this 
Court for the Court to decide. Defendant moved to suppress all 
physical evidence discovered after he was stopped at the Salt 
Lake International Airport, all statements made by Janice Ruben, 
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and all statements made by himself (R. 17)* The trial court did 
not make a ruling on defendant's motion to suppress with respect 
to the seizure of physical evidence (T. 40). The trial court 
ruled that the initial stop and taking of the goods into custody 
was proper; however, he specifically made no ruling either for or 
against defendant with respect to the seizure of the credit cards 
and checkbook (T. 40)• He also made no ruling regarding the 
telephone directory or the admissibility of the statements made 
to the police by Janice Ruben (See T. 40). The court did make a 
ruling with respect to the suppression of defendant's confession 
and ruled that it was admissible (T. 40). 
The trial court's decision not to rule on the 
admissibility of the checkbook and credit cards was based upon 
the prosecutor's representation that the State did not intend to 
introduce those items into evidence and, therefore, the issue was 
moot (T. 32, 39). Defendant's remedy if there had been an 
unlawful search would have been suppression of the evidence. 
Here, there was nothing to suppress. 
It is incumbent on a moving party to obtain a ruling 
from the trial court on the substance of the motion. Failure to 
obtain a ruling as the result of the trial court's declination to 
rule, an abandonment of the issue at the hearing on the motion, 
or otherwise precludes the movant from raising the issue on 
appeal, feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107, 410 P.2d 188 (Colo. 
1966); State v. Knight. 78 N.M. 482, 432 P.2d 838 (N.M. 1967); 
Fixico v. State. 735 P.2d 580 (Okla. App. 1987). 
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POINT IV 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE INVENTORY WAS PROPER 
AND DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT TAINTED BY 
PRIOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT OF THE POLICE. 
Defendant has waived any objection to the inventory of 
his luggage by, first, entering his plea of guilty, and by, 
second, failing to obtain a ruling from the trial court on this 
issue. The only possible way this issue could become relevant in 
this appeal is if defendant were to overcome the double waiver 
and the issue is found to be relevant to defendant's contention 
that the inventory and consequent seizure of items in his 
possession tainted his subsequent confession and that, therefore, 
the confession was fruit of the poisonous tree. However, in the 
present case, there was no poisonous tree and there was no fruit. 
Defendant was arrested pursuant to a felony warrant 
from Missouri obtained through the National Crime Information 
Computer (T. 20). Defendant does not contest the validity of the 
arrest. At the time of his arrest, defendant had in his 
possession certain items of luggage including a black leather 
briefcase, a camera bag with "a lot of expensive camera 
equipment," and a suitcase containing clothes (T. 20). After 
being questioned at the organized crime bureau office in Murray, 
defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County jail (T. 22). The 
jail will not accept large items such as the items of luggage 
that defendant was carrying, and it, therefore, became the 
officers responsibility to store the items (T. 22-23). 
It is well established that this Court should "not 
disturb the ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of 
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evidence unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error." State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985); £ia£fi. 
v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah 1986). Further, the trial 
judge is in the best position to determine the reasonableness of 
the conduct under the particular facts of each case. State v. 
Houser. 669 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983). 
It is also well established that inventory searches are 
an exception to the warrant requirement. Colorado v. Bertine. 
U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987); Illinois v. Lafavette. 462 
U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, n.8, 
(1976); State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 126 
(Utah 1983); State v. Crabtree. 618 P.2d 484, n.8 (Utah 1980). 
In State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 126, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated with approval that in "Illinois v. Lafayette, the 
United States Supreme Court answered in affirmative the question 
whether at the time an arrestee arrives at a police station the 
officers may, without obtaining a search warrant, search a 
shoulder bag in the possession of that person." In Lafayette, 
the Supreme Court held that it is not unreasonable and is not 
precluded by the fourth amendment to conduct a routine inventory 
procedure on all containers and articles in an arrested person's 
possession at the police stationhouse incident to incarcerating 
the arrested person. The reasons determined by the United States 
Supreme Court in Opperman for allowing inventory searches, cited 
with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, are 
three fold: (1) to protect an owner's property while it is in 
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custody of police; (2) to insure against claims of lost, stolen, 
or vandalized property; and (3) to protect police officers from 
danger. State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant claims that the inventory search was used 
merely as "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive" 
(Br. App. 5-6). However, defendant does not dispute that the 
arrest was made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant from Missouri, 
and defendant does not claim that there were any private parties 
offering or available to take possession of the items for the 
defendant. When defendant was informed of the impending 
inventory, he did not request that he be allowed to store the 
items in an airport locker or to make alternative arrangements, 
but requested only to be present when the inventory occurred (See 
T. 14). In any event, failure of the police to make alternative 
arrangements does not eliminate the justification for an 
inventory. Colorado v. Bertine. U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 738 
(1987). 
In view of these facts and the jail's policy on an 
inmate's personal belongings, the officer was justified in doing 
an inventory of the bags prior to placing them in the locked 
storage area . 
Defendant claims that since the search of his luggage 
was an unconstitutional invasion of his right to privacy, that 
his later confession should be ruled to be "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" and should be suppressed. 
Because the seizure was during the course of a proper 
inventory, there is no problem with the later incriminating 
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statement by the defendant being part of the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree", as "[al confession cannot be 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree1 if the tree itself is not poisonous." Colorado 
v. Spring, U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 851, 856 (1987). 
It is important to note that the prosecution did not 
intend to introduce as evidence the items that were seized during 
the inventory (T. 39), therefore the exclusion of those items 
would not jeopardize, or even affect, the prosecution of the 
defendant on the charge of bigamy. The prosecution would, 
however, have used a statement that the defendant gave to the 
police two days after his arrest. Defendant was arrested on 
November 14, 1987, and was thereafter booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail (T. 20-22). Two days later, when Sgt. Mann arrived 
at his office, he found two messages from defendant awaiting him 
(T. 23). In response to those messages, Sgt. Mann went to the 
jail to speak with defendant (T.23). Defendant stated that he 
wished to talk with Sgt. Mann and asked to be taken to Sgt. 
Mann's office to discuss the situation. Sgt. Mann complied with 
defendant's request by later that day taking defendant to his 
office where he again informed defendant of Miranda warnings and 
obtained a valid waiver (T. 24)• 
Defendant has never challenged the voluntariness of the 
statement he gave to police. He does not contend that he was not 
informed of his Miranda rights, nor that he did not knowingly 
waive the same. Nor does defendant show that the discovery of 
the items in his luggage in any way led to his incriminating 
statements made to police. 
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Defendant simply asserts that the inventory was a 
pretext for an illegal search and that his subsequent confession 
was "fruit of the poisonous tree." One who moves to suppress 
evidence must support the motion with proof. State v. Hinton. 
680 P.2d 749 (Utah 1984) Defendant did not meet this requisite 
showing, as determined by the trial court. 
Defendant ignores the fact that in order for a 
confession to be fruit of the poisonous tree, there must be some 
nexus between the illegally seized items and the subsequent 
confession. Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 
Narflpne V, United StateSr 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Dunaway v. New 
York. 442 U.S. 200 (1979); State v. Romero. 624 P.2d 699 (Utah 
1981). There was no illegality in the seizure of evidence. 
Regardless, the confession came some two days after the inventory 
and there is no evidence that the inventory and the subsequent 
confession were related in any manner or that the confession was 
the product or result of the inventory. The confession was so 
attenuated from the evidence obtained, that even if there had 
have been some impropriety, the confession was not "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." 
Defendant cites Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 
471, (1963) as support for the proposition that the confession 
was tainted. The instant case is easily distinguishable from the 
facts of Wono Sun. Pirst, in Wong Sun, the defendant was 
illegally arrested after officers broke into his business-home. 
In the instant case, the officer made an arrest, the validity of 
which is uncontested by defendant, pursuant to an outstanding 
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Missouri felony warrant. In Wong Sun, the statements in question 
were made immediately after the illegal arrest—in fact, within 
minutes. 371 U.S. at 410-411. In the instant case, the 
statements were made, as defendant admits, "two days after his 
arrest" (Br. App. 8). Even if the items seized were seized 
illegally, the seizure was so unconnected in space and time with 
the statements made by defendant "two days after his arrest," 
that the confession is not "tainted" in the sense of the word 
used in Wong Sun. Therefore, the trial court's ruling that 
defendant's confession was admissible was not error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests this Court to remand this case to the trial 
court, or, in the alternative, to affirm the decision of the 
trial court as to the pre-trial motions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of May, 1988. 
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